[VIDÉO] Il balance sa STRATÉGIE DE FOOT lors d'un BATTLE DE CLASH

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_GInHEGqbos&t=37s Pourquoi le Maroc pourrait déclencher une révolution dans les tactiques de football Morocco's starting formation in WC 2022 was a 4 3 3. However when they defended they rarely looked like this. It was more a 4 1 4 1. Given the modern play style of occupying dangerous spaces, with loosely fixed positions, Morocco's answer to this was to now allow team to move the ball into these positions. Areas such as half spaces were difficult to penetrate. given the extremely tight lines meaning any player in these positions could quickly be surrounded. The central area in front of the defense was excellently patrollled by Amrabat, constantly shifting from side to side, boxing in opponents and linking defense with miedfield. While being tight between the lines, Morocco was also very narrow, leaving spaces out wide which is their way of luring opposition into a trap. But not only these spaces in front of the defense were very difficult to penetrate, Morocco made the first pass from the opposition as difficult as possible. En Nesyri as lone striker wouldn't man mark the opposition's holding miedfield. He would rather shift to ensure the centrebacks couldn't easily pass the ball forward.If by chance they were able to move forward, the 2 miedfielders were almost always correctly positionned to force a pass backwards. This structure would force the opposition to play to ball out wide.or attempt harder to execute such as long switches in play. But all of this played into Morocco's favour with their team having their most dynamic and agressive players i Zyhech and Hakimi on the right. And Boufal and Mazraoui on the left, ready to close down the opposition. And if winning the ball back had the pace and technical ability to instantly create dangerous counter attacks. Eventually this would force the opposition circulating the possession around the back line. 1. Now it's also important to note that while Morocco certainly played with a defensive mentality, It was far from what is comonly referred as parking the bus. The defensive line wasn't too deep. And the miedfield was quick to close down any player in the center. In the quarter final, Portugal would often shift into a 3 2 build up pattern, with Morocco's miedfielders adapting to this change and man marking the double pivot, again forcing playing out wide. Given this compact central block, the opposition would often struggle to get their key players on the ball, leading a rather interesting effect. Portugal's main playing style involved getting their creative players such as Bruno Fernandes and Bernardo Silva on the ball between the lines, forcing the opposition's defenders to make a chooice and eventually trying to free up spaces for Felix, Ramos or Dalot on the overlap.However their inability to do so due to Morocco's defensive discipline led to frustration for the miedfielders who are used to set the tempo for their team. And in an attempt to be more useful, would often themselves dropping deeper and deeper to receive the ball from the centerbacks, at times ending with 5 players behind the ball. Now it can be ok on paper to have the keys players behind the ball. But it limits their attacking power, as now they can't outnumber Morocco's defense, meaning Morocco don't have to make a chooice on which space to cover given the fact that they were often in a numerical advantage like 5 v 3 situations. n attack. 2. This resulted into the opposition's being completly disjoncted. resorting to long balls over the miedfield hoping to win any knockdowns. Again it played into Morocco's favour as they had the space to attack forward. And pick out their most dangerous players. The clash new vs old was at his peak during the match Spain vs Morocco. SPain ended the game with 77% possession. They also had 2 twice the amount of shoot compared to Morocco. But the quality of the chances tells a lot. With Spain averaging an xg of 1,5 and Morocco 1,4. Against France in the semi finals, they were forced to play more agressive football as they were 1 0 down in the early minutes of the match. And they aere able, despite not scoring, putting France on the back foot for long periods during this match. Morocco took elements from Italian catenaccio in 1960s and zonal marking from in the 1980s to create a modern twist on the defensive block, sprinkled in with trending tactics such as a higher defensive line, and offensive fullbacks on attack. 3. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w4kUGaCNaug Why Morocco really could win the World Cup

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FvGKMjMVwAo&t=36s Pourquoi le 4-2-3-1 est la formation la plus utilisée dans le football moderne | 4231 Tactiques exp
liquées | Guardiola and Klopp both used the 4 3 3 respectively for Barcelona and Liverpool because it's considered as one of the most stable and best defensive formation. PSG, Man City, Liverpool and Barcelona also prooved that this formation could be very lethal. Goalkepper need to participate to the build up and be able to pick a pass when under the pressure of the opposition. The centerbacks must also be excellent ball players able to move the ball up to the miedfield or pick a piass in this miedfield. They will also need to play long balls for the wingers or strikers in front if the opposite defense is not set up properly. The fullbacks will support both attack and defense throughout the whole match. When it comes to the miedfield, it can vary with a flat form, a triangle with 2 defensive miedfielders and 1 offensive miedfielder or 1 defensive miedfielder and 2 offensive miedfielders. All the 3 miedfielders need to have excellent passing precision to pick players between the lines. They need to support the defense between the build up and pick out the forwards during the attack. The cdm shield the back line 4. The controller is seen often as a box to box miedfielder. He sets the tempo of the game. The creator finally link up the miedfield with the forwards above him creating the most chances of the team. Finally in front the wingers need to be good dribblers and excell in 1 v 1 situations. They need to have egreat understanding with the striker but also the fullbacks either cutting inside to give space to the fullback either staying wide and allowing for the overlap. The striker can either be a 9 and act often like a target man to score or pass to the wingers or miedfielders. Either it can be a false 9 like in the case of Messi in Barcelona. Something to keep in mind is interchangability. 1. For this formation to work, it requires teamates constantly cover other teamates runs. For example if the fullback pushes up the cdm can shift outwide to cover any defensive hole. If the winger move inside, the center attacking miedfielder can move out to the wing to stretch the opposition. Constant moves and position changes are what make this formation effective. This formation tends also to create more passing lane directly in the central area of the field. If 2 strikers are pressing the 2 centrebacks, either the cdm can drop between them, either a fullback sit further back to beat the press. Either the goalkepper can be used as a centreback even if it's more risky. The winger can drop deep and drag a defender to free space for a miedfielder to come in. It allows the 9 to play deeper for either the other miedfield either for the other winger cutting inside.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tbxvZc6FsHQ&t=539s 4-1-4-1 Tactics Explained | 4-1-4-1 Strengths & Weaknesses | Formation Principles

The 4 1 4 1 formation is often used by teams that like building from the back, which mean that the goalkepper must have great ball distribution ability. A great example of that is Neuer who allow his team to play in a high line since as a sweeper keeper he would be ready to close down any space made by the strikers and help the team to maintain control of the pitch. The 2 centerbacks need to have the ability to play under pressure and provide key passes forward and breaking the pressing lines. The idela combo would ahve one player capable ot carrying the ball forward while the other has a more versatile passing range, playing longer balls from deep but also providing more defensive cover. The centerbacks Carvalho and John Terry under José Mourinho set the record of conceding only 15 goals in the 2004 2005 season. Defensivly, the fullbacks will be tasked to cover the opposition's wingers. On the attack they will be required to push up to add width, creating overloads outwide and delivering the ball into the box. Ideally they will play on the side with their main foot. Some modern systems like Guardiola's one means that fullbacks can drift inside more frequently adding miedfield support and creating more passing angles. One holding miedfielder is one of the most crucial if not the most crucial position in this formation. He will be drifting side to side to help the team move the ball out of tight spaces. He will need to be great at progressing the ball but also have a strong physical presence to stop any run behind the miedfield line. Compared to similar lines up such as the 4 3 3, the holding miedfielder in a 4 1 4 1 does have a slightly more defensive mentality. Philipp Lahm executed this position to perfection. 1. He was also the focal point during the build up. The 2 more advanced center miedfielders need creativity and understanding with teamates as they need to join the attack and drop deep to help in the build up consistently during the whole match. They will rotate with the wingers or help to create overloads out wide. They must be technically gifted players while the wingers are usually the quickest players of the line up. The ideal line up would have the inverted wingers on both flanks. meaning they are more prone to dridft inside and freeing up the flanks for the fullbacks to stretch the backline. But having the wingers stretching the backline can also be benefical as it benefits the center miedfielders to attack. The wingers need to be good dribblers and excell in 1 v 1 situations. They must deliver balls into the box or making runs onto the back post. Finally the lone striker will sometimes be used as the focal point in front and will need to have excellent hold up play with the ability of laying out the ball for the center miedfielders of the wingers. The ideal striker here would be a false 9 vacating into the spaces in front of the backline and creating spaces for the players to attack ahead of him. Francesco Totti is a good example of that. This 4 1 4 1 formation is versatile allowing to have a lot of cover on the pitch from side to side meaning there will always be a passing line options available. When defending it can shift into either a 5 4 1 either a 4 5 1. 1. When attacking it could shift into a 3 4 3 if the holding miedfielder drop between the 2 centerbacks and the fullbacks are pushing up. Or if the wingers stay high and out wide, it can shift into a 4 3 3 formation. The presence of a lone striker mena that a long play from gk into the stirker is not ideal as the front 4 would need to push up to provide help and that means that if the team looses the ball, it can create a gap between the meidfield line and the defensive line. However if used in the right way to bypass a heavy press it can be quickly deadly and create counter attacks. If played against a 4 3 3 formation, it will be more difficult to outnumber the center. However it can quickly get the upper hand on the flanks given the fullbacks wingers combo. The wingers would need to start wide to pin the opposition's fullbacks and prevent them to adding to the press. This means fullbacks usually have space to receive the ball. However the team need to be patient in moving the ball to them. This is because if the team pass the ball directly into t fulback, the opposition can quickly read this and close off a back pass and forward option meaning the team is trapped on the flank. Realistically they would want to move the ball to the fullback indirectly throught the center to force the opposition to move closer to the center, givint the fullbacks more spaces and giving him time to push up past the winger to receive. To do this the holding miedfield will usually be shadow mark by the stirker so having one of the center mieds dropping either side of the striker 2. If the opposition plays as 4 4 2 it's much harder to gain an advantage on the flanks. However there is an extra player available on the pitch. The difficulty with this formation is the initial 2 v 2 with the centerbacks and the 2 strikers. So a goalkepper with the ability to play with his feet is crucial to help his team finding spaces. In this scenario, the fullbacks are not as useful during the build up. In the other hand, the holding meidfielder will be important by droppingdeep between the centerbacks to help creating a 3 v 2. If the holding miedfielder is pressed then one of the 2 others center meids will be free and will have space ahead of him to attack the backline

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sH5beYkoVXA Why Argentina deserved to win the World Cup | Tactical Analysis Scaloni starting Di Maria on the left wing is not something that many would have expected. And It was a genius move. Argentina took advantage of France's passive nature. They knew that they would not or very rarely press their centrebacks. So they already had a secure base to build up from. They used a double pivot with Messi inverting and Molina pushing up on that side. Rabiot could press De Paul more but with Messi behind him, he is not doing that. This mean that Argentina had a 4 v 2 or 5 if you include Molina. Those pivots were in these pockets of space all the times. Especially Enzo Fernandez. With Rabiot and Tchouaméni very deep, just like Griezmann close to the defensive line, nobody was picking up Argentina's pivot at a point. Given spaces in central areas, Argentina could start their combination game. finding players between the lines or finding third man run. Since it was easy to breach throught the french press, Argentina created loads of situations where either Rabiot or Tchouaméni stepped up to deal with whoever was driving forward. And Messi could just drop off the shoulder and pikc it up without any trouble at you. When you have this congestion around Messi with Rabiot and Tchouaméni, France left spaces in the left. Mc Allister pushed high up to force Koundé inside and free Di Maria. It's ok for France to have his back line to be narrow and to leave spaces behind. But for doing this you need pressure on the ball. Di Maria was subbed off probably too early. Because Argentina was no longer pressing that much compared to the first half and their defensive line became deeper. 1. There were less pressure on the wide centerbacks. But Argentina's agressivity on the flank meant that France couldn't find any combination in the middle. But some minors signs showed that the match could change like Hernandez and Mbappé getting the ball more easily. Without Di Maria and with a much deeper line, transitions were more difficult. Both France's goals ocurred after turn overs in the miedfield. On the first goal before the penalty, ENzo Fernandez gave the ball under the pressure of Rabiot while Messi lost the ball to Coman before Mbappé's second goal.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lEmz3dGqe24&t=445s The Barcelona ‘Pivot’ - How Busquets mastered football’s hardest role Back then when It was decided to promote Guardiola in the Barcelona A team, people criticized it because he was described as a player that had little to no strenght, a player that couldn't defend and that was not good in the air. But one year later, he was part of Cruyff's famous dream team playing as a pivot at the base of this miedfield diamond. Despite lack of athletism, Guardiola had some qualities that were necessary here. It's technic and insight. With fluid movements, triangles and the endless ball circulations, he could play football just as he wanted. He also had incredible positionnal sense. Having Guardiola here allowed him to inttercept passes, break up play and even applying pressure, not by sprinting 30 meters but by moving a few meters at the right moment. Before retiring, Guardiola suggested that players like him had become extinct because of the game becoming more tactical and physical. It was when Guardiola became manager of Barcelona's B tema in 2007 that he discovered Sergio Busquets. Guaridola promoting Busquets as a metronome of his possession's machine in Barcelona A team was similar to Cruyff's promotion of Guardiola. Busquets just like Guardiola appeared as too lanky, not strong enough, but was a master of technic and more crucially, position. The fact that Guardiola put a very young Sergio Busquets at the heart of the game was already enough saying about his potential. As the most central player you are at the hub of possession. 1. The connexion between all the nodes in the network. It's throught you that the ball is circulated. He was constantly forming triagles with his teamates to create passing options and find the third man which is fundamental concept is possession based football. But identifying space is also very important here. Scanning every few seconds, tracking spaces on that pitch can look easy at first. But it's not. Adding that to executing the perfect pass under heavy pressure is very difficult. His technic and passing ability thought the liens are also exceptionnal. It's not a coincidence that he was often positionned perfectly to intercept a pass. Busquets was a better version of Guardiola since he also had the capacity of being a miedfield destroyer with those long, telescopic legs and exceptionnal timing. He made more interceptions and tackles than every Barcelona's players every year since 2015. He is also very capable on the air, accomoding to the diminutive stature of his meidfield colleagues. 2. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZY7D3fv_Sn0 La Tactique qui a Changé la CARRIÈRE de Pep Guardiola !

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cujw_dPOJ64 How Ten Hag Broke Pep's System | Tactical Analysis : Manchester City 1-2 Manchester United 1. YouTube Football Made Simple How Ten Hag Broke Pep's System | Tactical Analysis : Manchester Cit... City dominated the possession but United still outplayed them. Man United was happy to not have the ball, not having to press very high on the pitch. It meant that City's center backs got on the ball pretty easily. United allowed City to have possession as long as it was not in the center of their own half. Having Bruno in center forward, it was difficult to get the ball on the double pivots. He would drop on one of the pivots. Mc Tominay, an attacking miedfielder would push onto the remaining pivot. Ten Hag was willing to leave spaces out wide if it meant that half spaces were closed for City. Garnacho and Rashford tucked infield. United were playing narrow 4 2 4 with 2 mobiles engines leading the defensive efforts. Ten Hag did this because he noticed the shape City had used during recent matches with Pep using his fullbacks ore as traditionnal fullbacks. It would allowed the wingers like Foden or Silva to play more centrally into their natural positions. But now City hardly found anyone between the lines and with the double pivots covered, Bernardo Silva would drop deep to try to make a 3 v 2 situation against Fernandez and Mc Tominay. Foden drifted infield on the left hand side. So City's miedfield was often split into 3 attempted progressors and 2 attempted creators. But this hypothetical 3 v 2 was more a 4 v 2 in United's favor because the front 4 was so norrow and compact in his space. Ten Hag was willing to let City's fullbacks to get on the ball as they were barely a threat compared to the central players. It made it difficult to find the progressors and easier to stop the fullbacks who were not grade 1 v 1. Kovacic and Silva often dropped into the half spaces vacated left by the fullbacks

But knowing there was one less men at the center, United could look to tigh up that City's men fairly easily in that zone. But this shape caused even more problems to Cyt due to the Rashford Walker dynamic. Walker being high gave Rashford too much of a head start on transitions. It forced City to restrategize with Walker and Bernardo Silva having to rotate. It was more dangerous than having Walker in that zone. But from the deeper zone Walker was less secure with his passing. He was often forcing passes into dangerous zones which could result into turnovers. The narrow 4 afforded Maino and Amrabat and the freedom to be more man oriented on the 2 creators, following them aroud the pitch and looking the make their lives miserables. They were willing to track them even when they looked for rooms in the fullbacks. But United's defensive shape was not impenetrable and Haaland would look to drop at times to play in one of the rushing miedfielders. This worked well when Haaland's touch was on point. But it was often not the case. On the left De Bruyne and Gvardiol would often switch roles. It meant De Bruyne would have more room to pick up a pass. But City looked the most dangerous when De Bruyne and Foden not spilt the pitch in hald but looked to overload one side. Since united pivots had 2 mens to pick up, it created opportunities of combinations. But with the 2 attacking mied committing to one side, it would often mean that during transitions, the far side fullback would potentially have room to attack if they received the ball. ALternativly a quick switch would also mean a guaranteed 1 v 1 against the fullback. 2. United were pretty comfortable men to men against the creators. But when the ball got wide one of the biggest game changers was having one of the progressors make a late run to create a 3 v 2 advantage and try to break United's defensive line shape. But when Kovacic or Rodri made the run they left the other pivot vulnerable on the transition as Walker would be instantly moving out wide to cover Rashford. So it leads United to play pretty easily throught the center, allowing United to settle with long and quick switches to the other side, like the one that led to Man United's second goal. Pep needed to change something and that change came from the magic Doku provided. Balls were passed much more on the left side to Doku. By comparision, Bernardo Silva had much less balls on the right side of the pitch during second half time compared to the first half time. This lead to an intense battle between Doku and Bissaka with both having their moments. But it's throught the secondary impact on Foden that Doku's impact was best shown. With Gvardiol coming in, Man United had to double team against Doku. That meant that with Stones also being a pivot, Foden had more spaces in this zone. Foden had during the second half more key passes and shot compared to the first half. 3. Jude Bellingham combined that traditionnal physicality of english players with the technical flair that let him fits in modern day football.
Bellingham back then when he was 16 years old was playing in diferent positions for his developing and to create also room for more senior players. In classic 4 4 2 he was more acostumed with playing as the central miedfielder role. But one field where he didn't stand out from the others was his passing who was quite average. He couldn't be the metronome who could break the game, open with long range passes at will. When it came to pass attempted and progressive passes he was below in ranking during the 2019 2020 season. It's where he was playing as a pivot who could take either an attacking either defensive role that Bellingham thrived. His pace combined with his technical ability was imediatly noticed. Half of his appearances were out wide on paper at lst since he would start out wide and at tiems hold his width when the game demanded it particulary when he was on the left handside. Bellingham here would develop his off the ball intelligence. Bellingham would often drift centrally into the half spaces with hthe freedom to find pockets of spaces to make the difference. He would often do that, receiving and looking to lay on teamates instead of him at times. It was his ability to take on a man and create a shoot that stood out. In Dortmund, Bellingham kept progressing. 4. Dortmund took advantage of his wide asset of skills as he could take a role anchor deeper alongside Delany, Witsel or Dahoud. When Dortmund was playing in 4 3 3 Bellingham was tossed with oen of the highest roles on the left handside, granting him a lot more freedom. His ball security increassed. His risky role however meant that he was dispossessed more than 92% of miedfielders and had pass completion bottom 20% for miedfielders. As one of the hubs of the side, Bellingham could not solely rely on his off the ball ability any longer. He was the man often receiving from the center backs. He made just that making himself more and more available to receive the ball. This was complemented by his increased maturity on possession of the ball as he showed more discenement, He acted more like a conductor. However his passing was still lacking a bit, especially his game changing passes. His attributes however still start to go from very good category for a young player to world classas he was given the most advanced role whatever it was in a 4 3 3 or inn a more defensive 4 2 3 1 alongside a more defensive player like Witsel. When he received the ball into the central congested zones, he was too big, too quick and too technical for almost every opposing miedfielder. It became comon especially during the transitions for Bellingham to pick the ball deep and drifting pass the opposition's miedfielders. His attempted take on were at least superior to 85% of central miedfielders in the league. Also his passing game evolved and progressing, eventually making him a complete miedfielder.

His progressive passes, passes into the final third and long balls completed increased. Dortmund generally are a ball dominant side that try to pin their opposition inside their own box. Therefore Bellingham was heavily involved in the final third play, using his ability of drifting between the lines unoticed to engage quick combinations. He was involving himself more in the opposite box, making more and more last minute runs to get a goalscoring opportunity or a goal scoring creating chance. For somebody playing as a traditionnal miedfield Bellingham already in the past as a lot of involvment in that final third.His touches in the box and his line breaking runs, he became a game changer for Dortmund.His shoot creating actions as well as his decision making were in progression. Ancelotti was the perfect man to get the best from Bellingham's new form. That's why Bellingham's move to real madrid was perfect. ot only Benzema going in Saudi meant that there was a hole in the 9 position, bu Ancelotti was also cursed with having too many high quality miedfielders. So the miedfield diamond was the solution for Ancelotti.Modric and Kross were aging but both were still far superior orchestrators from deep. Bellingham was a monster at carrying the ball from deep with his feet while Valverde had the ability to provide similar athleticism from deep. So instead found himself at the cutting edge of the diamond. When the game called for it, Bellingham could still momentally drop deeper to be the extra option. 6. His increased possession and security were still important in these deeper phases. But now with the forwards being both natural wingers who will take the drift wide, it was vital for Bellingham to provide a strong central presence. He didn't play as a centre forward or even as a false 9. He was very much an attacking miedfielder. He revealed his ability to find spaces to receive between the lines. He thrived in this role with world class miedfielders being able to find him being on the receiving end of progressive passes. As he developed a strong relationship with the forwards, his ability in tigher regions also improved. Bellingham often happened to be into the box at the right place at the right time. His shoots were now taken more at optimal positions compared to before where he had to make more long shoots. His goals and expected goals vastly increased as a result.

Le 20 août 2023 à 10:10:32 :
Jfait une passe à mon ah ah euh merde

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=okWFWAfdfro How Deschamps Learnt From Germany | Tactical Analysis : France 2-2 Portugal |

Santos stick to his 4 1 4 1 for Portugal while Deschamps went for a 4 2 3 1 with Tolisso on the right wing. From the goalkick, Varane and Kimpembe would split to give Lloris options on either side whilst a pivot completed the diamond. But when they did choose to press higher, Portugal were pretty effective with Jota and Bernardo covering either wide man and Ronaldo on the pivot. Even if France could have use a double pivot to counter this, this was riskier so they often opted for long balls. Generally Portugal weren't looking to press high partirulary in open play. Instead they would be shifting into 4 1 4 1 shape. When defending they dropped sometimes into what looked like a 4 5 1 rather than pressing in the final third. France looked to take advantage in the wide regions just like Germany previsouly did during their 4 2 victory over Portugal. It could involve Tolisso dropping deeper almost like a center back whilst Pogba and Kanté create a double pivot. This would allow Koundé to advance much higher down right as would Hernandez on the far side to provide the width. Just like against Germany it could mean that Franc's backline could be outnumber at times. So if the fullbacks defended wide there would be gaps in the half spaces. But if they defended too narrow, the fullbacks would be. Griezmann being on the right inside half space, he could drag Guerreiro here and free spaces for Koundé to push up on the right. Occasionally we saw Kanté dropping as a left center back with Pogba and Tolisso often creating the double pivot. But more effective way was Pogba splitting between the center backs early on and this would allow the fullbacks to push up and to provide France the necessary width. As Kanté and Tolisso were deeper they didn't have the same passing range than Pogba. As Portugal would content to sitting, it would mean that Ronaldo wouldn't press him, allowing Pogba to dictate the tempo of the game. He ended with the most passes of the match. But Pogba was also much more penetrative from deep, often looking for balls over the top or throught the lines to a man making a run. Mbappé may have been offisde, but Pogba finding him still was a warning sign. Benzema's second half was a better example of this. Pogba played a perfect pass to Benzema for him to finish. As Pogba dropped between the center backs, it created a 3 v 1 situation against Ronaldo who was alone in front, giving Pogba all the time he needed to head up and pick a pass. But as there would still be 2 v 1 situation anyway, Pogba oushed into the miedfield which would trigger Tolisso to push into the inside right position to create a front 5. Griezmann had the freedome to play behind them, joining the miedfield when needed as well as pushing up higher when he liked, often rotating with Benzema and Tolisso. With only Ronaldo high, France switched into a 2 2 6. So Tolisso, replaced later by Coman, would be the inside forward with koundé at right back. With 2 cb, a double pivot with Kanté and Pogba, Griezmann is free to drop deep or push high with Tolisso in the inside right channel. With the constant interchanging in the front mens, meant it was difficult for the center backs to pick one man. This leads up to the first penalty as Pogba was initially in a center back position so Tolisso was deeper as a pivot alongside Kanté. Then Pogba spread the ball into the wide while Tolisso advanced into the frontline. Hernandez and Mbappé on the left dragged Bernardo and Semedo, creating a wide gap in the defense. With 3 mens in front being narrow, it forced Dias and Pepe to remain narrow. It created gaps into the half spaces that Pogba could expose, leading to the foul. The portugal wingers like Jota and Bernardo were willing to track back much deeper, preventing France's fullbacks to overload here. When Portugal had the ball on the play, France generally shifted to a 4 4 2 shape. Griezmann and Benzema would press high making it difficult for the center backs to progress throught the center. Sometimes they could stay deeper to cover the pivot. To compensate for the potential 3 v 2 advantage, Tolisso defended more narrow, not as a traditionnal winger. That meant Guerreiro was often free in the wide regions. but Renato Sanches would often drop into a left center back position This could draw Tolisso higher up the pitch leaving Guerreiro a lot of spaces. And Jota and Ronaldo would cause overloads down to the left handside by coming across. But they weren't able to make the most of them. But it was often Danilo Perrera who would drop between the 2 center backs to form a 3 v 2 to ease the pressure against the defense. The disdvantage of this is that their initial 3 v 2 advantage in the miedfield now became a 2 v 2. So we saw Ronaldo dropping from center forward to an advancing miedfield position a lot, trying and create this. But he wasn't often able to get turned. Mbappé was often defending wide left. And he isn't always the best with tracking back. So Portugal's right back could at times overlap Bernardo Silva, leading to some dangerou

situations.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NeYZ4fjHSXs Tactical Analysis : Spain 5 - 3 Croatia | The Two Sides Of Enrique's Spain |

During this match Spain, had 4,3 expected goals while Croatia had 3,7 expected goals. Croatia early on weren't looking to press very high. So Unai Simon could play sure to the center backs. Initially Croatia did defend in a 4 1 4 1 with Brozovic being deeper and looking to sweep up. There was so a man to man structure with a 3 v 3. Busquets would have spaces in his deeper positions to dictate the game. He ended with the most touches and passes on the pitch right behind Aymeric Laporte, a center back. Modric would often look to push up alongside Petkovic creating a 4 4 2 whilst trying to use their cover shadows in order to close down the passing lanes to Busquets. So Spain needed a 3 v 2 advantage in deeper regions to keep possession lore easily. By having Azpilicueta often starting a lot deeper from the left side, they managed to do that whilst Gaya was much more offensive on the right side, pushing up to the left. But thsi defensive shape could cause Croatia problems in the miedfield as they were now 3 v 2 down. With Koke dropping alongside Busquets, Spain could switch to a double pivot while Pedri would push up and had plenty of spaces between the lines at times as the Spain's front 3 stayed high and wide, forcing Croatia 's center backs deep. So if s Spanish pivot was receiving the ball and Brozovic was drawn into pressin this would create even more spaces between the lines for Pedri to receive and look to create. At 2 1 up for Spain, we saw these problems for Croatia with Modric and Kovacic pressing the double pivots. It left Brozovic as the sole miedfielder left deeper. So Azpilicueta pushes into the miedfield to draw Brozovic, meaning that Pedrihas now spaces between the lines. He can advances and plays to Ferran who is often high and wide who finds Azpilicueta with a pin point cross who had continued his run. But with a single pivot, Koke and Pedri would both push high and wide into the half spaces.In second half time, Croatia used a 4 2 3 1 when defending at times which would allow the miedfield to stay thigh at Busquets and limit his influence. But before this, they had problems with Spain's miedfield creating issues for their 4 4 2. Koke and Pedri would be hard to pick up especially with Gaia and Ferran providing the wide. Spain was also excellent at overloading left hand side with laporte pushing higher up and Gaya providing the width. It would allow Sarabia to come narrow, which would then Pedri to drift around the pitch but often move deeper to the left hand side. Laporte and Pedri would often look to pass to the left back on the blind side of the fullback if he was poorly tracked.In second half Pedri often combined with Ferran who had switched over the left hand side Ferran would often look for a cross into the back post with Azpilicueta pushing high up as well as they looked to overload Gvardiol. With Rebci being slow to track back, that meant that Gvardiol was caught in 2 v 1 with the chooice to either moving narrow to track Koke, either staying wide to track Ferran. We also saw that when Gvardiol was wider with more spaces between the center backs. It led to a massive chance with Koke being able to make the run between them. Croatia's best moments was during transitions when Spain having pushed 2 miedfielders high up in possession. Spain faced problems in transitions, especially in the left hand side. Rebic could receive the ball and drive high up the pitch Orsic and Pasalic were bring in to operate on the left hand side as they were more effective. . They would often during transitions force Azpilicueta to remain narrow. It would allow Orsic to have spaces out wide to receive. He would look then to swing a cross. And this led to a big chance in extra time. We also saw some of this in the equalizing goal with Pasalic picking the ball in good position in the miedfield on the wrong side of Fabian Ruiz. Orsic is then in great position providing the width in the left hand side. Orsic then makes the perfect cross so Pasalic can finish as Croatia were committing bodies into the box

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PR5YwMakYvI&t=46s How Brazil Won The 2002 World Cup | Brazil's Joga Bonito Tactics |

Some think that it's obvious that the team should have win the tournament with the team they have. However Emerson Lia during preparation and qualifying matches, only won 4 on 11 matches. Scaloni then came one year before the WC and Brazil managed to qualify only with 3 points advance. Brazil set a formation for the tournament that generally looked like a 3 4 3 with Marcos gk, Lucio, Edmilson and Roque as the 3 cb, Cafu and Roberto Carlos as the wingbacks. Kleberson and Silva as the central miedfielders and the R trio in front with Ronaldinho, Rivaldo and Ronaldo Nazario. Only variation of this was a 5 3 2 or 3 5 2 where Ronaldinho would be set as an attacking miedfielder while Juninho would play instead of Kleberson as a more defensive minded miedfielder. Marcos often made long balls high up the pitch looking for Ronaldo. Ronaldinho and Rivaldo would come narrower to pick up the second ball. Roque and Lucio, the wide center backs, were more conservatives with the ball, playing risk free passes into Gilberto Silva or Edmilson who was the central center back. Playing with only 2 central miedfielders meant that they could be at times overloaded in the miedfield. So Edmilson played the role of the libero, pushing up in the miedfield to the point that the formation sometimes looked like a 4 3 3. But Edmilson could also stay deeper and look for a ball into Gilberto Silva; This was the case especially when Juninho came alongside him in the miedfield as he tended to be more offensive and drifted high up the pitch. And crucially when Edmilson played deeper, then Roque and Lucio would shift into wider regions. This gave Cafu and Roberto Carlos 2 position defining wingbacks. Their passing and positionnal rotations quickly dragged mens out of position. (modifié) And Brazil was comfortable exploiting both the wide areas and the central regions. 3 of their matches were against teams that played with 3 center backs, Costa Rica, Turkey and Germany. So Roberto Carlos and Cafu were found in wide regions to be in 1 v 1 against their men. They had the physical as well as the technical ability to breeze past their men and make the cross When wide regions were targeted, the role of the forwards could vary. They could push up into the half spaces ALternativly Ronaldinho in particular could move to the left channel as a more traditionnal winger while Rivaldo and Ronaldo would shift across. Juninho if he was starting would push higher to take the place vacated by Ronaldinho. Edmilson would then push up in the miedfield to ensure they would not be overpowered in that area on the transition.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U7xsb2Fvy7E Diego Simeone's 2020/21 Tactics | Atletico Madrid 20/21 Tactics | How Atleti Have Evolved |

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Ex4sFw0AKw How Pep Dismantled Ancelotti | Tactical Analysis : Manchester City 4-0 Real Madri

d| We saw similarities with the first leg with Stones pushing up in the miedfield. The back 3 consisted then of Akanji, Walker and Dias. Gundogan and De Bruyne pushed higher on the pitch into the half spaces. The press for real madrid would be start with Benzema and then Modric who would look to cover on of the double pivots. But to not have 1 v 2, Vinicius and Rodrygo would operate extremly narrow, allowing Valverde and Kross deeper and pick up the men in the half spaces, making the progression more difficult centrally. Since the double pivots were often pressed a lot, the wide centerbacks had the ball very often. If the ball went to the wide center back, it would be easy for real madrid's wingers to come out and apply pressure. Camavinga and Carvajal would be very agressive against Man City's wingers City's wingers pushed high, forcing real madrid's fullbacks to stay deep. Because of the wingers and Modric pressing the double pivots, Real Madrid was able to deal with the players in the half spaces with Valverde dropping deep allowing Real Madrid to shift from a back 4 to a back 5 to match City's front 5. If City's pivots were able to turn that would change the game completly. Man City's movements often allowed Stones and Rodri to drag Madrid's mens into pressing them, meaning that Walker was free to receive in wider regions. When Walker is drawing Vinicius from his narrow position, that left Modric more isolated and combinatinos between Rodri and Stones often allowed Stones to receive, makes the turn and drives into the heart of the miedfield. In these situations, Valverde couldnt afford to drop that deep as they would leave Man City overloard the miedfield too easily, meaning that Man City often managed to outnumber Real Madrid's backline. We also saw how both Grealish and Bernardo Silva were good against their fullbacks in 1 v 1 situations. When the fullback got tight, players in the half spaces were making consistent runs sometimes only trakced by midfielder.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XHRhoYLuPNw How Xabi Alonso’s Tactic BROKE Football!

Xabi Alonso went from pulling Bayer Leverkusen out of relegation to win the Bundesliga title in only 18 months, breaking German football. This club never won a league title since 100 years. From being a tiki taka team in first half to a counter attacking side in second half, based on diferent teams, Alonso keep changing his tactics. It only only confuses others teams but also make it almost impossible to break throught. They became the first team to win the league without loosing a single match. Since taking charge, Xabi has consistently used a 3 2 4 1 formation on paper. But instead of being ridig it keeps on changing during the match. It makes them unpredictable to play against. During build up they often play in a 4 2 4 asymetric shape with the right back staying upfront as a right winger while the back 4 spread wide to form the back 4. The reason is that German clubs are often press oriented, meaning it was difficult for others teams to build up short. So Xabi applied circular rotations, meaning that when opposition are pressing to the center backs, it passes it to the left back who deliberatly carries the ball and drifts toward the pivot. The right pivot simultaneously shifts on the right and takes on the right flank position. Due to this inward movement, it narrows down the front markers which frees up the right space for the right pivot who has a path to break throught the first line of pressure. But if opposition sits in low block this tactic can become ineffective. So to counter this, Alonso used a tactic that is a miw between Guardiola's in City and Zerbi's Brighton. For example when one of the center back passes the ball to one of the pivot, the pivot quickly passes the ball back to him. It creates a pressing trigger to the markers to close the 2 players down which indirectly frees up spaces for the second pivot to receive an actual pass. It attract markers who are behind him. Due to this it creates an open space between the lines where one of the forwards drop deeper to receive the ball as a third man, which then draws one of the center backs and frees up space for the striker as fourth man. They use oppositio'ns press as a weapon against themselves. But if opposition, rather pressing 1 v 1 than pressing ni numbers with low press strategy, it also can be frawned. So to adress this, Xabi intentionally overload one presser with 2. WHe the center back is looking for a pass from one of the pivots, Palacios, who is close to Xhaka, intentionally jumps right in with Xhaka It confuses XHaka's marker who is being ready for a 1 v 1. Once the ball goes th Xhaka, Palacios is unmarked and becomes the third man to avance up the pitch. When entering in the second phase of build up, Alonso uses a combination between Guardiola's positionnal play and Diniz's relationnism. After the first phase, both pivots moves vertically to each other. Also their asymetrical approach makes Leverkusen play more on the right side of the pitch. It triggers the narrow right forward to shit to that side as well, creating a 6 box structure on one side of the pitch. At the same time Grimaldo the left back drifts wide to imitate his partner's winger role. If opposition commit a lot of mens to cover the 6 men box, then Bayer can easily switch play toward the left towards Grimaldo who only has one player to defend them. If they spread to cover the opposite player then it can create a 6 v 5 superiority on the other side where they can easily progress the ball with one touch. He uses Diniz's relationnism to overloard one side of the pitch and Pep's positionnal play by using the box tactic. When they drift into the attacking phase, they switch from a 4 2 4 to a 3 2 5 structure where Grimaldo finally advances to act like his opposite partner, Frimpong. But rather playing this way it's generally used to trick the opposition's markers. If Leverkusen use a 3 2 5 shape, opposition often mark them using a 5 4 2 defensive structure. It makes difficult for Bayer to pass throught the block and often force them to rely on long balls. So to solve this one of the inverted forwards from the front 5 drops deeper and act as a roaming number 10. At the same time it gives both the wide center backs options to carry the ball forward while partnering Palacios with the roaming player. This makes the opposition shift to focus on the incoming center backs. It creates open spaces between the second and third line of defense. When receiving the ball, these players quickly join the front 4 and try to exploit the back line. Once they actually get near the box using this, the front 5 do the remaining work where they shift the entire opposition into one side. To achieve this they often pass the ball wide to the side player while the player inside the half spaces makes a deliberate wide run toward the flanks and draws his marker. This movement then frees up a striker without a man, leading the back line to spread towards him. When the ball is passed to the half space player it effectivly draws most of the opposition to the first half of the pitch which leaves the far right and right space player with just one marker. So a quick cross to them exposes the opposition's defense while creating a prime socring opportunity for Bayer Leverkusen. However Xabi's tactics trully emerges when out of possession. Witohut the ball they press in a 5 2 3 setup. The main objective was always to protect the center channels. So he created an interesting star line pattern to adress this. For example, when opposition build up from the back, Alonso asks his front 3 to be narrow with both of the pivots just behind them, creating a compact star shape. It creates a numerical superiority in the center with a box 4 behind the striker. Even if the opposition still paly throught the center, Alonso encourages his wide center backs to step up as well makig it almost impossible to advance centrally. This forces the opposition to go wide. But as soon opposition plays wide the wingbacks quickly jumps onto them, creating a one side overload. The far sided center back track the wide options. It makes the opposition to go back and switches the play or trust their aerial ability. Even if the opposition breaks Bayer's perssing pattern, the team quickly transition into a 5 4 1 shape with the inverted forwards becoming the wide miedfielders. Due to the 3 center backs and the double pivots shileding the central areas, it helps to keep the opposition attack wide with the wingbacks and wide miedfielders to protect the flank. WHen they win the ball back using this, rather than quickly launching counter attack, Alonso let the opposition press them more in which he invites the opposition to couter press and let them commit more numbers forward. As the opposition is fully into their counterpress, Bayer quickly execute a long ball toward the forwards who are being left isolated. It makes them the most dangerous counter attacking sides as they use opposition's psychologie to their advantage. It can be only achieved with the player's roles. Rather than a traditionnal back 3, they form a back 4 with the right center back covering space behind the right wingback who is pushing up. The left back stays deep and takes the role of a wingback. Rather than being a traditionnal wingback, Grimaldo is one of the most versatile player in the squad who can operates as a winger during attacks, invert as a pivot during build up and even act as a third number 10. However, he still fills his duties as a fullback when neede unlike Frimpong who had been assigned to a right winger role. Frimpong's positionning is even proactive than Trent as you might see him as a right winger, as a numer 10, even as a striker in various occasions. he also serves as press releasers due to his positionning for the central players. Palacios is a box to box miedfielder as he drops deep alongside Xhaka in the 4 plus 2 build up, then advances into spaces between the lines during the attack. Xhaka is the deep lying playmaker, being the main man launching counter attacks. Hoffman plays as a narrow attacking miedfielder giving Frimpong more spaces to take on the right wing while the right winger mostly controls the right half space. Wirtz in the other hand plays in a more wider role. When Grimaldo stays back to form a back 4, Wirtz takes the left wing to maintain the width. He also serves as a key playmaker with Grimaldo who drops between the lines to connect the miedfield with the attack. In order to create spaces for Wirtz between the lines, Xabi assigns both his center backs as ball players. He encourages them cto carry the ball and draw markers higher to open gaps between the lines. Boniface in front is used as a pressing forward. Due to his speed and strenght he plays a massive role for pressing the opposition from during the build up and in the counterpressing if they loose the ball. Their style os to blend the control with attacking mindset. In defense in order to apply a pattern at pressing they play with a high line and apply pressure across the opposition's half. In the ifnal third they are excellent at working the ball into the box, using close connexions and driving the ball at defense to create spaces between the lines or flanks. Due to the close proximity of players, Alonso always favored short passes It's a possession based team who also excelles in counter attacks. A team that plays with a structure but also without. This is a team using opposition's counter press against them while also using counter press against their opponents

Le 02 septembre 2023 à 16:56:23 :
Presque ANAL

FULL

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jLdhDE73HUU How Thiago Motta’s Tactic is Shaking up Serie A!

Thiago Motta used a system that see center backs being used as miedfielders and fullbacks as center backs while the keeper is the first attacker and the striker the first defender. His tactics are a fusion between 5 top managers philosophies, espacially Mourinho's counter attacks and Low's counterpressing. Motta was a player who played as a holding miedfielder. Playing with diferent top clubs across Europe he met diferent styles of play. This influced his coaching carrer and tactics. He took inspiration for build up from Cruyff. Attack like Gasperini's Atalanta. Counter attack like Mourinho's Inter and counterpress like Low's Germany. Motta started his manager's carrer with 2 failures but after this he realized that applying multiple philosophies is not enough if his teams cannot maintain basic possession. The ball became his primarly focus when joining Bologna. He said his players to use the ball as their close friends and they should keep it as long as possible. He started to succeed even beating top teams like Juventus while maintaining possession. His tactics gained significant attention. His keeper is one of the players in the middle of the pitch. He sees football in a upsdei down perspective. Rather starting his formation horizontally he vizualizes it vertically where he imagines 2 players at the base, a miedfield including the goalkepper with 2 players remaining at the top. When turning arou,d it ressembles to a familiar 4 3 3. But this one is diferent than normal ones. Motta prefers to overload more players in the central zone. Just like roaming miedfielders, he gave his striker and center backs roaming roles where the striker acted a a miedfielder who drops time to time. Motta allows both central defenders to push forward alternativly or simultaneously. If both of them advances, then the fullbacks tucks inside to take their place with the goalkepper acting like an extra defender. This completly disorganized others opposition's shape. As both defenders are upfront, they need extra player to cover these 2 and if they bring markers other than thr forwards, it opens spaces for Bologna attackers to exploit thought long passes. So the opposition often send their striker or wingers to mark them. It allow Bologna to play from the back quite easily. If opposition take a risk and play with 3 5 2 it would create a 5 men shield in front of the back line. So they employ a pass and push strategy to counter this. When a center back has the ball he quickly pass it to the other center back who drift forward taking a marker with him. It creates a passing line at the back where the keeper takes the position. With the pivot dropping back, it creates a 6 v 5 numerical advantage. Even if the opposition presses their backline, the advancing center back becomes a passing option which indirectly put the opposition in dilemma. It eventually helps them progressing the ball with ease. Unlike normal teams who employs vertical couter attacks from back to front, Motta uses a 2 7 2 shape to execute counter attacks. They shift on one side of the flank to drag the opposition toward that side as well. While the player on the opposite side stay wide just like a forward stays higher. As soon as they win the ball back, with no fear of offsides, they can play a quick diagonal pass toward him. This maneuver makes him a free man with enough spaces and time to cut inside and create a scoring opportunity. Zirkzee, the striker is assigned to a flee flowing role that is more dynamic than a false 9. His movements are not limited to vertical runs as he also moves into spaces you would not expect a striker to move into. Doing this he becomes a plus one advantage during build ups. Bologna often positions themselves as a 3 2 4 1 formation during their second phase of build up. This helps them to create a box structure not only in the center but also on the left and the right. This allows them to outnumber their opponents with always a free pass. But if the opposition is strong and can afford to play with a back 3, they could easily cover the box with 1 more marker. This is where Motta's roaming striker becomes useful. He can moves into these boxes, creating an additionnal passing options to create numerical superiorities. It maintains Bologna's ability to maintain players and progress throught the spaces into the final third. In the final third, Motta follows a similar philosophy to Mourinho's, inviting the opposition into their own half and launcing a quick counter attack. One problem about Mourinho's style is that as soon as the counter starts, apart from the forwards and the number 10, noone can advance quickly, putting immense pressure on the forwards with more markers around them. So Motta hadded his own touch into this tactic with both center backs advancing forward, Motta allows his miedfielders to adop a more agressive positions where the center miedfielders joins the front 3 by occupying the half spaces while the number 6 becomes the number 8. It establishes numerical superiority in counter attacks. The greatestthing about this is that it indirectly leads them to counter press with numbers with one pivot advanced, which is quite uncomon for a counter attacking team. In the final third one of the center backs drop deeper to form a back 3. The advanced center back is acting as a barrier against any long balls aimed at them. It helps the others players to press fully the opposition and regian the ball. Defensively Motta focues on protecting the central areas. Even when defending the center backs often press up high and cover the opposition's number 8 while the cdm drop deeper to cover the opposition's striker. When the opposition attack, they look like a 3 2 4 1. But as soon as they shift wide, both center backs drifts back to form a compact back 5. It transitions into a 5 4 1 shape. It allows the fullbacks to rpess more agressivly while ensuring central dominance, making them a difficult side to break down. They are the third less conceding side in the entire Serie A being just beside Juventus and Inter MIlan. The reason why player roles make these tactics unique is that keeper firstly play as pivotal role while the fullbacks have more defensive role. Their main job is to stay narrow and take the positions of the center backs when they advance. Both center backs and the libero dynamically move up and down the field to confuse the markers. It allows miedfielders to adopt more advanced positions. Due to this all 3 of them are playmakers. The right miedfielder Luis Ferguson is given a more roaming role. Unlike a box to box miedfielder who moves up and down, Ferguson moves more horizontally and drops wide into fullback's position when they tuck inside or takes the winger position when they invert. On the wing, both of them areinverted wingers. For horizontal counter attacks they typically stay wide and quickly inverts as soon as there is an opportunity. Motta's team has strong emphasis on keeping the ball. So the strategy resolves about keeping control of the game with possession. To maintain the 2 7 2 system he plays with 2 wide players on each side of the pitch at least. In defense Motta prefers high line and close down his opposition to apply JOachim Low's counter pressing strategy. In the final third, they work into the box and run at defense

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C2quutPSHPQ La Meilleure Tactique de Man United dont Personne ne Parle…

Back thenin 2007 - 2008, Man United displayed their best football, having Tevez, Rooney and Ronaldo as their attacking trio. To the point that only Guardiola's Barcelona stood out as a worthy competitor. If Barcelona didn't exist, Man United would have win 2 more UCL. If they didn't loose FA Cup to Portmsouth, 2007 2008 season would have been their second treble after 1998 1998 season. During this season Sir Alex favored a 4 4 2 formation with Vidic and Ferdinand being center backs. Scholes and Ronaldo would be respectively central and right miedfielder. Rooney and Tevez would form the front 2. However it was not typical 4 4 2 as it was more asymetric with opposition having difficult time to read them. You could see the striker dropping deep and passing for a central miedfielder takign a striker position for example. Roonay, Ronaldo and Tevez scored 70% of United's goals this season. As soon as they lost the ball they employed a 3 shape pattern. In the front 2 one would drop deeper than the other usually. Upon regaining ball the miedfielder would immediatly launch ball into the more advanced forward. He could then pass back to his partner coming from deep, trigerring defenders to move towards him. This then clears up the space for Ronaldo to cut inside. Their positionnal play however was what made them stand out. In every situation Sir Alex aimed for numerical advantage situation during build up. Many teams at that time adopted a 4 4 2 formation with their front 2 marking the center backs. Carrick would often drop between Vidic and Ferdinand to counter this while Ronaldo joins the front 3 and Giggs drifts centrally as number 10. So the formation often looked like a 3 3 1 3. It stretched the opposition vertically which allowed the front 3 to position themselves near the lasrt line of defense. It provided United short options as well as long options to exploit. Also this formationc reated a numerical superiority almost everywhere on the pitch. The back 3 allowed Man United to bypass the first line of press. When the ball was being played wide, Giggs was playing in the center and then drift into the half space near the ball. This structure helped United to pass throught the first as well as the second line of press. But United didn't only played from the back as opponents didn't dare to send a lot of players forwards in that time, making it difficult for Man United to create spaces at the back and usually were roamed around the half line. So to counter this Sir Alex Ferguson would position 6 players into the attacking half with the wide miedfielders moving inside to act as number 10. The fullbacks would push up to take the winger roles. It lead opposition to favor more man marking rather than zonal marking. It opened spaces between them and Man United capitalized on this by playing long balls into these gaps. With the opposition being busy with 1 v 1, It xwas easier for the frontline to use their skills and speed. But when Man United lost the ball rather than pressing directly, they agressivly targeted the potential passing lines and tried to intercept their connexions. If United's first line of press was bypassed, they would drop back into a mid block where they applied theyr successfull system helping them to regain possession which they call 1 + 3 support pattern. When someone loose the ball he is going to press him and then 3 players must shield the ball carrier from the left, right and center. These players act as supportive pressers, aiming to create a diamong shape around the player. They constantly pressed the opposition this way and won the ball back quickly. When they got the ball into the final third, they would often split the defensive opposition. When attacking, United often transition into a 2 3 5 structure When ball is played to Ferdinand who attempt a diagonal pass to Ronaldo who is out wide for example, the players who are in the half spaces make wide runs. This drags his marker and Ronaldo's markers near the flanks. It cuts the opposition's backline into half. Central players from United then take their , remaining positions inside the box. So a quick cross from Ronaldo could be a disaster for the opponents to contain and result in conceding. They had good crossing tactics with both wide sides of the 5 positionned to stay wide. Among the 3 others players, one would target the near post drawing the attention of both center backs and the goalkepper, while the others 2 were given the freedom to roam according to the spaces created by the first player's movement. It often leds to a 2 v 1 situation over the opposition's fullbacks. It increased their probability to win the ball from crosses and score. But when defending, as they move back into their 4 4 2, every players are instructed to stay within their position. During the opposition's build up, Sir Alex prefered to not engage with high pressing with his forwards. He made a mid or low block inviting his opposition to advance further. One of the reasons for this was to create spaces behind the advancing opposition and hit them on the couter into these spaces whetever they won the ball back, effectively turning defense into attack. When it comes to the players roles, Van Der Sar was a standard goalkepper who rarely went out to sweep the ball Unlike many goalkeppers today, he was not used a lot in the build up. Ferdinand would be the ball playing defender in the right. With his excellent passing range he could play long balls into the forwards. On the left, Evra acted more as a wingback, pushing higher than Wes Brow, the right back, occupying the spaces left by Giggs or Ronaldo once they invert. Carrick would be a deep lying playmaker, playing often deeper than Scholes and form a temporary back 3 when needed, allowing the fullbacks to take off. He also originated a lot of Man United's counter attacks and was an excellent long passing footballer. Scholes was acting like a roaming miedfielder, as a connecter between the lines, interchanging positions with wide miedfielders and forwards. While on the right, Ronaldo would act as an inside forward, usually staying higher than a typical wide miedfielder. He inverted most of the times and attracted markers toward him, creating spaces for others to take on and score. Rooney acted as a deep lying forward, being a creator, with his ability to drop and drawing defenders out of position facilitating Man United's attacking patterns. While Tevez would play more as an advanced forward because he had the skills and the strenght to loose defenders easily and break the defensive line. Back then there was a surging trend of counter attacking football. So rather than applying control or attacking mindset, most managers used to play with a balanced style which gave them the chance to hit teams on the break while maintaining their structures. Sir Alex liked to stretch his team both vertically and horizontally. He kept a high tempo in order to apply quick transitions while their defensive structure was ba lanced,, using a 4 4 2 mid block in order to attract the opposition's further. When it comes to final third, Ronaldo and Scholes were given the freedom to take shoots from far. Using their V shape passing, they used also a lot of throught balls during counter attacks. These tactics does not look very applicable today but back then, many managers took inspiration from this and clinched titles in the seasons that followed. Using these concepts with the right kind of players made Man United one of the best team in history of football.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jGDKh-I1C54 How Pep Won The League With His Weakest Tactics | Man City 2023/24 Tactical Analysis After winning the treble,

The expectations were not that high for Man City now especially after the departure of Gundogan Outside him, Laporte, Cancelo, Mahjrez and Palmer were all leaving. It was made worse by the fact that John Stones spent most of the early part of the season unavailable. When De Bruyne went out with an injury during the first match of ths season, it was about to be a difficult season. At the beginning Guardiola still was prepared for the challenge and instead of John Stones, It was Akanji who would push from the defense to the miedfield during the build up. But Akanji was more traditionnal centerback than Stones, raising some worries about how he would copte. If the Citys back 3 was pressed, Rodri would look to free himself to take the ball as much as possible as he could. He would often then look for the bounce pass to Akanji who would now receive the ball while facing the rest of the play. He was actually great. But Akanji still struggled more to turn back to the opposite goal when he got the ball compared to Stones which often led to a safe pass back to the center back. Even if City could deal with that, the miss of Rodri during the 2 games he was suspended against Arsenal and the Wolves during which City lost showed how important he was to the side. Pep tried to deal with that with replacing them by players like Kovacic and Bernardo Silva as a double pivot. Or play Rico Lexis from right back and invert Despite having great retainers of possession, they lacked penetrative passes that Rodri often made when he was here or the penetration Rodri is making ball to feet. But even when Rodri was in the starting XI, teams were beginning to figure out how to defend against Manchester City. More often the opposition looked to protect the center at all costs. It would make it harder the City's miedfielders to create danger on top. Opposite's wingers would operate narrow as well. Often you would see the opposition defend in narrow 4 4 2 with the front 2 not being bait into the press. Add that to the 2 central miedfielders and you had a box defending shape to counter the box miedfield City was using. Bernardo Silva would look to drop outside the narrow block to receive the ball The downside would be that there is one less attacking player upfront. This was not helped by the fact that Alvarez often got played as a 10 rather than a center forward. Alvarez had to be trusted at making the creative burden, something he couldn't do especially against such narrow defenses. Despite being a press skilled resistant miedfielder it happened that Kovacic was put higher on the pitch more as a 10 than as a 6. The lack of plays into the center meant there were less services into Haaland. And to make things worse, Haaland had a less effective season in front of the goal considering the expected goals he missed and the expected goals he scored compared to the last season. Guardiola made the 2 wide center backs playing extremly wide, almost as traditionnal fullbacks. It was made to draw a presser out of the center block to create more passing lanes in the center. Despite having 2 v 1 in these wide regions, the central center back would be isolated. Also the wide center backs were unlickely to advance high. But having the opposition playing this narrow, it left more possibilities for the winger having 1 v 1 situations. However when City's wingers dropped deeper to receive the ball, the opposition could be very agressive to prevent the winger turning on the ball. So Guardiola needed some individual brillances to make the difference and it came from Doku while Grealish is more a ball retainer with less ability to take on his man. Doku represented so many threats that the teams would often send their fullback mark him earlier or double team against him. But this would create room for the higher miedfielder to get the ball to create. However Doku who was a solution, could also be a problem. Grealish tend to retain possession while Doku loose it more often. And with the wide center backs so wide, opposition would be ready to hit on the transitions if the ball was lost. Aside from Walker, the back 3 was not very quick. However Pep could look to be ultra agressive with Ederson being an extra center back, shifting the backline to a back 4. Advantage of this is that no matter if opposition was pressing gk and defenders or not, there was a free man to look for. If the opposition stayed narrow and defensive, the defenders would be free. It was a solution althought not an idea one since it was made by the wide center backs who were not as progressive as the miedfielers. Also even Ederson would not be too adventurous to force a man out of the press as if he lost the ball, City would wuickly concede without a goalkepper. That's why Man City had to rely on De Bruyne more than usual. However in De Bruyne's absence, Foden was more than happy to take his place. He was one of the most creative players of the season in his dribbling, passing and even shooting. However as limited creativity in the center and half spaces and Haaland as being the lone goalscorer, Pep needed Foden to start centrally as much as possible. Pep used often to invert his fullbacks. But as the season progressed he used them more and more traditionally, allowing one of them to operate wide to provide the width and on rare occasions both mens pushing high. Seeing Gvardiol and Walker in these positions became more and more comon. It allowed the likes of Foden to be more times infield positions and to create centrally. He was able to pass the opposition defensive miedfield line to create a potential for a shoot in the goal or assist. No wonder he won the Premiere League player of the season award. This added the benefits of freeing up Silva or Kovacic to drop in to provide the numerical overload in the deeper zones. It would make the progression less difficult as well as going into the creative zones. Man City still looked very bulverable on the counter attacks. Having Walker playing high doesn't help as even a player as fast as him can't gain so many ground to catch up if the advance between him and the opponent attacking his goal is too much. Also Walker took a step back defensivly Also having Akanji higher meant that a lot were asked to the center backs. So City conceded more than double the amount of goals on counter attacks than conceded during the 2022 2023 season. Despite this City was third before De Bruyne returned so they needed to make an exceptionnal finish. Then De Bruyne made his return, boosting not only his own stats and City's ones but also Haaland's ones. Despite De Bruyne moving out wide more often, him and De Bruyne still showed that they had a great understanding of each other. Also De Bruyne and Foden often made switches, drawing opponents and creating spaces for each other. Then at the end of the season, Bernardo Silva played more wide to facilitate De Bruyne and Foden playing centrally.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iiDqpY72gRs&t=430s Tactical Analysis : Argentina 3-0 Croatia | Messi Magic Gets it done |

Despite having less the ball than Croatia, Argentina had a clear plan whatever in deep side of the pitch as well as high up. Initially out of possession, Croatia could defend with a single forward even if Modric from miedfield could push higher up alongside Rovariv. However one oh his role was stopping the progressive miedfield from Argentina. So when Fernandez or Paredes drop deep at times, Modric would be the man tasked with pressing high on the man in order to make it more difficult for Argentina to get ball from deeper to higher. Only difference was that against Brazil when he was picking up Casemiro, only Danilo was left to progress the ball. And Danilo is not that good at progression. With with Paredes and Fernandez Argentina had 2 excellent ball progressers, making it difficult for Modric to stop the play. When Modric was pressing a man, both Fernandez and Paredes were comfortable with dropping deeper to form a back 3 and drawing Modric higher on the pitch. With Argentina would still have a 3 v 2 advantage with the halp of the 2 center backs against Modric and Kramaric. It woud allow not only Molina and Tagliafico to push higher on the pitch, but also as a result, both miedfielders De Paul and Mc Allistair would tuck in. With Modric dragged higher up there was a potential 2 v 3 down in favor or Argentina with Kovacic and Krozovic as central miedfielders against Paredes, De Paul and McAllistair. When Paredes dropped betwee, the center backs, Fernandez would take his place. So Croatia started to defend in a more conversative way with Modric dropping back along the miedfielders. But with Modric applying less pressure on him, Fernandez would push into the miedfield with Otamendi and Romero taking care of the progression against Kramaric. Croatia was aware about Argentina often attacking with 5 mens in previous matches so to avoid being outnumbered, we could see Pasalic dropping deeper to make a men to men situation, which mean that even if Argentina overloaded one side of the pitch and forced the defense shifting across, there would never be the free man on the far side. It was coupled by Croatia moving narrow with Perisic tucking in. So the center was well protected. So rather than McAllistair and Messi pushing too high, both operated as more traditionnal miedfielders for most part of the match. That meant that with a man advantage into the miedfield, space could be found spaces especially with Alavrez being a threat in front with his pace and runs, to push the back line deeper. Messi ended up with the most passes and dribbles in this match. At times when Messi was in these half spaces zones, Gvardiola was agressive on him This could leave spaces where runners like Molina or Alvarez could take advantage of. However it's worth noting that all 3 Argentina's goals were not really coming from Argentina's tactical masterclass but rather from pure quality and brillance of players like Alvarez and Messi. Messi wasn't pressing a lot fo Croatia could get out from the goalkick pretty easily. Even in deeper zones, Argentina maintained their 4 4 2 shape. Brozovic could drop between the center backs if needed. But for the most part, Brozovic dropping deep wasn't needed as a back 2 was enough. Croatia looked to push their fullbacks very high to allow their wingers to tuck in; We saw it especially against Brazil. To create a 5 v 5, Mc Allistair could drop for a few times into the back line. With Kovacic, Modric and Brozovic, Croatia had 3 outstanding deep miedfielders, allowing them to keep possession at 60% during the match. All 3 tended to move into one side of the pitch to take advantages of the wide regions. We often saw it on the left handside of the pitch, allowing Susa to push high and Perisic to move infield. But Croatia's problem is that their miedfield was not that good at creating chances. They were good instead at progressing the ball and keeping possession. Keeping the 3 miedfielders deep was a tactical chooice by Dalic so at times it was difficult to find a player between the lines. At times when Perisic came in front, it would Kramaric who would drop in. But he is not an attacking miedfielder. This was made worse by the fact that their shape meant that the fullbacks were the ones in 1 v 1 situations. And neither of them were particulary good at passing their man the ball at their feet. And the rare moments they did a cross, Kramaric being the progressive player at times made it difficult. Add that with tha aerial dominance of Otamendi and Romero. Sosa was replaced by Orsic who would start wide then tuck in with Petkovic replacing Kramaric looking to pin back the center backs. Perisic would be the one at left back position and now he would be in 1 v 1 situations, where he was better at than Sosa. However it iwas too late and not enough.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H1WI2hMDvDk Argentina 1-0 Brazil Analysis |How Argentina won the Copa America|

Argentina step on a 4 4 2 shape. Brazil in the other hand sticked with the same formation that got them into the final with the 4 3 3. When Argentina had the ball, the Brazilian forwards were tasked to press them. Brazil sometimes committed even 4 players high on the pitch However there were periods on the game where Brazil wasn't able to press as high on the pitch. When it happened Argentina's right back tucked in allowing Argentina to keep possession in a 3 2 system. Paredes and De Paul were operating as a double pivot in the miedfield while the 3 defenders provided the base behind them, allowing Acuna as a left back to play much higher. We also saw Lo Celso coming infield from the left so he could receive the ball and make the turn. In these areas, he was often joined by Messi would would be seen drifting from his position upfront in order to get more touches on the ball in deeper areas. Messi did that during a good part of his carrer. However he struggled to have a bigger impact on his match than what he probably expected. Making runs forward in these advanced areas of the pitch is Acuna's strenght when operating as a fullback both for club and country even if Brazil did a relativly good job at limiting his threat into the final third; On the right handside of the pitch, the danger came from a winger rather from a fullback. Di Maria would start wide before making runs inside with his strong left foot. We saw Di Maria providing the width quite a lot. But the biggest impact of course came from central areas as he chipped the ball over Ederson to score the only goal of the match after Sandro's mistake in defense. While Brazil had the ball in their own third we sometimes saw Argentina looking to put them under pressure. So we saw both center backs splitting to play alongside the keeper. However up the pitch Brazil looked to build in slighty diferent way from Argentina by using their center 2 3 shape to progress the ball. Just like Argentina however, Brazil's left back played much higher. Lodi looked so to play higher on the pitch. But Argentina managed the situation well. Lodi providing the width meant that both Neymar and Richarlison were able to play extremly narrow with Neymar dropping deep to receive the ball before running at the opposition's backline. Paqueta was then given the license to play as rthe most advanced player of the miedfield 3, making runs into the final third in order to support the attack. Another reason Brazil struggled that much in the right handside was Danilo not making that many runs in front, meaning that Argentina could often double team up on him and limit Everton's impact.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iB48Ns1wGvY Brazil 2-0 Argentina | Tactical Analysis |How To Stop Messi|Copa America 2019|(Goals:Firmino, Jesus)

On paper Brazil lined up in a 4 2 3 1 with a back 4 made of Marquinhos, Silva as cb, Sandro and Alves as fullbacks. Arthur, Casemiro and Coutinho were in the miedfield. Coutinho and Jesus provided the width and Firminho was forward. On paper Argentina lined up with a 4 3 3 with Foyth and Tagliafico as fullbacks. With Otamendi and Pezzela as center backs. Acuna and De Paul made the miedfield with Martinez, Aguero and Messi on top. Often one of Brazil's fullback would tuck in with the other giving the vertical depth by advancing high on the pitch. It would draw Argentinas forwards who would often use their whole front 3 during the press. If the route to the fullbacks were cut off, the double pivots, Artur and Casemiro, had to give passing options more centrally. Argentina's problem with collective press was that Firminho was great at creating vertical depth which would draw Argentina's center backs deep. It often created spaces for the likes of Coutinho between the lines. So Argentina in 2 diferent ways who themselves caused problems. If they pressed high up, they left a gap between the defense and the miedfield and Coutinho will be feed up between the lines. But if the miedfield dropped deep, Coutinho would drop deeper as well. It would give him time from these positions to look for an incisive pass. Argentina's forwards would often be slow to track back during fast build up. And with Alves and Sandro being highly attacking fullbacks, it would create 2 v 1 or 1 v 1 on the flanks. Argentina tried to correct this by dropping into a 4 4 2. But this would leave them light in the center. So they often choose to guard the center while leaving up the flanks. To sustian pressure, ifi they had the time to do so, Argentina would often drop into a 4 1 4 1. But even when the ball was on the far side, Brazil looked to keep at least on man wide to stretch the opponent. The width Brazil maintained drawed both center backs out of position. It left Jesus with a free shoot into the box. At the same time, Brazil was controlling the match and never over committed. This was achieved by the center backs and defensive miedfielers in positiosn when they were on the ball. As for Argentina, Tagliafico was comfortable with both defensive and attacking parts. But Foyth is usually center back. So his attacking range was limited. This meant that their attacks had to go thought the center a lot of times exclusively. The ball often went to Paredes. But Argentina's build up looked like often a 2 3 3 2. Brazil alternated between a high press and a deep 4 2 3 1. Because of the lack of width, Argentina would often rely on Messi to drop deep and build up. Scaloni often had Acuna or De Paul dropping into the half spaces in order to draw the attention away from the center to give Messi and Paredes more spaces. But Brazil's double pivots dealt with this as well. They always kept Messi in front of the shield, never allowing him between the lines. If Messi dropped deep, Brazil pushed high and if Messi pushed higher, the team dropped deeper. To get Messi away from the goal, Brazil kept him ahead of both Casemiro and Arthur. Also when Messi dropped deep, the forwards didn't provide a descent passing option for an easy forward pass. When Di Maria came on the left, things kinda improved with him providing the width on the left. As Argentina committed more players forward, Brazil remained dangerous on the break, keeping players high in order for counter attacks. This eventually led to the second Brazil's goal.